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DEMOCRATIC VALUES IN A DIGITIZED 
WORLD: REGULATING INTERNET 
SPEECH IN SCHOOLS TO FURTHER THE 
EDUCATIONAL MISSION 
The Internet is a remarkable tool—so remarkable that using the word 
“tool” to describe it is painfully inadequate.  With a click of a mouse, a 
few strokes on a keyboard, or a swipe on a screen, the Internet allows 
instant communication and transaction at any time by anyone in the 
world.  Young people, especially, have embraced the Internet as a means 
of communicating with peers and interacting with the world around them.  
In fact, the Internet may be thought of as a social context—similar to 
school, church, or home—where young people’s identities are influenced 
and shaped.  As a result, what takes place online may have implications in 
the off-line world.   
One of those offline places implicated by Internet expression is the  
public school system.  Public elementary and high schools are unique 
institutions.  They have long been recognized as playing a dominant role 
in maintaining our democratic society by inculcating in students certain 
values such as respect, honesty, citizenship, responsibility, and integrity.  
And, because public students enjoy less constitutional protections on 
school grounds and during school hours, public schools have been 
permitted to discourage expression and behavior that conflicts with those 
values.  But there is a disagreement over whether public schools may 
discourage Internet expression that conflicts with those values.  This 
Comment seeks to explain why permitting schools to limit certain Internet 
expression—regardless where or when the Internet expression occurred—
promotes the educational mission of public schools. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Jane is an average teenager.1  She is a sophomore at the public 
school where she has a 3.24 grade point average, goal tends for the 
junior varsity soccer team, and is a member of the Italian Club.  Jane has 
a part-time job at the movie theater and sometimes babysits her younger 
sister when her mom works late.  In addition to these regular activities, 
on a typical day Jane spends four hours and twenty-nine minutes 
watching television shows, two hours and thirty-one minutes listening to 
music, one hour and twenty-nine minutes using the computer for 
purposes other than school-related activities, one hour and thirteen 
minutes playing video games, and one hour and thirty minutes texting 
her friends.2  In all, Jane spends an average of seven hours and thirty-
eight minutes per day—seven days a week—exposed to some form of 
media technology.3  
For schools, this excessive media-use phenomenon can be troubling, 
especially if Jane decides to create a fake profile, posing as one of her 
teachers, on a social networking site containing offensive content.4  
Because of the connectivity of youth today, views of that profile will 
likely spread like wildfire among other students and community 
members.5  If this situation unfolds, the school faces a crossroads: the 
school can punish Jane and demand that she delete the profile—running 
the risk that this action will violate Jane’s First Amendment rights—or 
the school can do nothing and tolerate student behavior that runs afoul 
of the school’s educational mission. 
 
1. Jane is a fictional person representing the average American teenager. 
2. VICTORIA J. RIDEOUT ET AL., GENERATION M2: MEDIA IN THE LIVES OF 8- TO 18-
YEAR-OLDS 2–3 (Jan. 2010), available at http://www.kff.org/entmedia/upload/8010.pdf. 
3. Id.  In the past five years, the number of hours an average eight- to eighteen-year-old 
spends connected to media has increased by one hour and seventeen minutes per day—the 
numbers add up to a total of fifty-three hours per week that young people are connected to 
some form of media.  Bonnie Miller Rubin, Teen, Tween Media Use Rising, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 
20, 2010, at 4 (reporting on the Kaiser Family Foundation findings). 
4. See generally Emily Gold Waldman, Badmouthing Authority: Hostile Speech About 
School Officials and the Limits of School Restrictions, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 591 
(2011) [hereinafter Waldman, Badmouthing Authority] (discussing the challenges that the 
Internet and digital communication pose to regulating student speech originating outside of 
schools). 
5. See Douglas MacMillan, Chasing Facebook’s Next Billion Users, BUS. WK., July 25, 
2012, at 30–31; Somini Sengupta, Facebook Revenue Edges Ahead of Expectations, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 24, 2012, at B1 (indicating that of the one billion Facebook users, 60% access the 
social networking website from their mobile phones). 
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Pointing out the dilemma created by student Internet expression is 
by no means a novel observation.6  Numerous cases have emerged 
involving students who were punished by schools for their Internet 
expressions.7  Many commentators have discussed the need for guidance 
from the Supreme Court and have proposed tests for how to deal with 
these types of cases.8  Some commentators advocate the position that 
student expression on the Internet can never be regulated by school 
authorities.9  Some propose that schools can curtail expression only if it 
targets students but never if it is directed at the school or its 
authorities.10  And others suggest that schools should be able to regulate 
student Internet speech only in extremely limited circumstances, such as 
when the speech could reasonably be interpreted as a serious threat to 
cause bodily injury11 or when the Internet user allows public access to his 
or her expression.12  Other suggestions for tests for student Internet 
 
6. See, e.g., Alexander G. Tuneski, Note, Online, Not on Grounds: Protecting Student 
Internet Speech, 89 VA. L. REV. 139, 140 (2003) (“Today, the threat of disruption from off-
campus student speech has risen significantly because of the advent of the internet and 
continued efforts to integrate the medium into the classroom setting.”). 
7. See infra Part III. 
8. See Harriet A. Hoder, Note, Supervising Cyberspace: A Simple Threshold for Public 
School Jurisdiction over Students' Online Activity, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1563, 1594–96 (2009) 
(suggesting a “control and supervision test to determine school jurisdiction over students’ 
online speech”); Sandy S. Li, Note, The Need for a New, Uniform Standard: The Continued 
Threat to Internet-Related Student Speech, 26 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 65, 102 (2005) 
(suggesting that the Tinker standard be used because “it is both broad and flexible enough to 
balance the needs of a student’s right to self-expression and the school’s need to maintain an 
orderly and safe educational environment”). 
9. See Frank D. LoMonte, Shrinking Tinker: Students are “Persons” Under Our 
Constitution—Except When They Aren’t, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1323, 1325–26 (2009). 
10. See Jacob Tabor, Note, Students’ First Amendment Rights in the Age of the Internet: 
Off-Campus Cyberspeech and School Regulation, 50 B.C. L. REV. 561, 591–93 (2009) (arguing 
that student speech can only be curtailed if it disrupts the classroom learning environment 
and that off-campus student speech aimed at teachers, the school, or the administration 
cannot reach that level). 
11. See Adam Dauksas, Comment, Doninger’s Wedge: Has Avery Doninger Bridged the 
Way for Internet Versions of Matthew Fraser?, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 439, 459 (2010) 
(“[T]he Supreme Court’s analysis should rest on whether a reasonable person in the student’s 
position would foresee that any user . . . would reasonably interpret the speech as a serious 
expression of intent to cause bodily harm.”). 
12. See Kara D. Williams, Comment, Public Schools vs. MySpace & Facebook: The 
Newest Challenge to Student Speech Rights, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 707, 726 (2008) (“[A] workable 
standard for determining whether students’ postings . . . are protected by the First 
Amendment must consider whether the students opted to set their profiles to private.”). 
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speech include a categorical approach,13 a factors test,14 and a 
reexamination of the Tinker15 standard.16  These are just a few examples 
of the proposed tests for school regulation of student Internet speech, 
but they are all testaments to the complexity of the problem faced by 
schools and the need for a uniform standard. 
This Comment does not propose yet another workable standard for 
the Supreme Court to fashion when it ultimately hears a student 
Internet speech case.  Rather, it discusses that the Supreme Court 
precedent, as well as state constitutions and statutes, already establish 
the authority of schools to limit student expression on the Internet that 
is directed at the school or school officials, even if the speech originates 
beyond the schoolyard.  In doing so, this Comment explores both the 
Court’s historical emphasis on the role of schools in educating students 
on how to be citizens in a democratic society,17 and the way the Internet 
is infiltrating our lives not only as a communication and information 
tool, but also as a social context.18  Because of this important role of 
schools and the pervasiveness of the Internet in society, the Court 
should decide that schools have the discretion to punish their students 
for speech that harasses teachers on the Internet. 
Part II addresses how the goals of public education, particularly the 
cultivation of civic values, have shaped Supreme Court decisions on 
 
13. See Caitlin May, Comment, “Internet-Savvy Students” and Bewildered Educators: 
Student Internet Speech is Creating New Legal Issues for the Educational Community, 58 
CATH. U. L. REV. 1105, 1138–41 (2009) (proposing that off-campus student speech that 
“advocates violence within the school community” be exempt from First Amendment 
protection and that non-threatening speech remain “the traditional fact-based analysis 
articulated in Tinker”). 
14. See Clay Calvert, Off-Campus Speech, On-Campus Punishment: Censorship of the 
Emerging Internet Underground, 7 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 243, 262–69 (2001) (outlining a 
five-factor test for student speech cases); David J. Fryman, Note, When the Schoolhouse Gate 
Extends Online: Student Free Speech in the Internet Age, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA 
& ENT. L.J. 557, 589–91 (2009); Stephanie Klupinski, Note, Getting Past the Schoolhouse Gate: 
Rethinking Student Speech in the Digital Age, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 611, 647–50 (2010). 
15. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
16. See Li, supra note 8, at 102–03 (proposing that only the substantial disruption test in 
Tinker can be used to determine whether schools unconstitutionally infringed on student 
Internet speech); Matthew I. Schiffhauer, Note, Uncertainty at the “Outer Boundaries” of the 
First Amendment: Extending the Arm of School Authority Beyond the Schoolhouse Gate into 
Cyberspace, 24 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 731, 765 (2010) (“If the school claims that the 
expression [is] threatening, it should be analyzed under Tinker’s ‘rights of others’ prong.”). 
17. See infra Part II.A. 
18. See infra Part IV.A. 
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student speech.  Part II.A outlines the origin of public education in the 
United States and then examines the goals of public school education 
today.  Part II.B discusses the Supreme Court precedent on student 
speech, focusing on the Court’s interpretation of the school’s role in 
relation to students’ rights.  Understanding the Supreme Court’s 
characterization of the role of schools as inculcating democratic values is 
important to understanding the Court’s rationale for previous 
decisions.19  The Court’s underlying rationale provides a guideline for 
future decisions. 
Part III analyzes several lower court decisions involving student 
speech expressed on the Internet.  This Part compares those cases where 
the courts have ruled in favor of school limitation on student speech 
with those cases where the courts found school limitations to be 
unconstitutional.  This Part seeks to examine the relationship between 
the lower courts’ decisions and Supreme Court precedent. 
Part IV.A examines how the Internet is changing rapidly and 
becoming a necessary tool in many peoples’—especially teenagers’—
daily lives.  Part IV.B discusses how harassing comments on the Internet 
can materially disrupt the school environment, and suggests that schools 
ought to have the discretion to regulate Internet expression that disrupts 
the educational mission. 
II. THE EDUCATIONAL MISSION AND STUDENT SPEECH 
Since 1969, the Supreme Court has heard and decided only four 
cases involving the public schools’ authority to limit student speech in 
public schools.20  However, none of these cases provides clear guidance 
for limiting off-campus speech, Internet speech, or speech directed at 
the school or school personnel.21  As a result, a debate exists concerning 
 
19. See infra Part II.B. 
20. See infra Part II.B.  This number does not include cases involving the censorship or 
removal of books from a school’s library, such as Board of Education v. Pico.  See, e.g., 457 
U.S. 853 (1982).   
21. Rather, the cases involved political expression at school, lewd and vulgar speech at a 
school-sponsored event, student expression in a school-sponsored publication, and speech 
seen as promoting drug use.  See infra Part II.B.  Although the majority did not view it as 
such, Morse v. Frederick has been interpreted as involving suppression of off-campus student 
speech.  See, e.g., Klupinski, supra note 14, at 615 (“[A]lthough the Court avoided the issue of 
whether schools can proscribe speech that originated off school property by deeming the 
banner ‘school speech,’ the Morse decision helps expand a school’s authority to discipline 
students for off-campus speech.”).   
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how the “tests” created by the Court in the four-student speech cases 
apply to student Internet expression.22  However, this Comment suggests 
that the four Supreme Court cases are not as limited to their specific 
facts as some suggest; rather, the Court’s underlying rationale for its 
holding in each case can similarly be applied to student Internet 
speech.23  This Part addresses the origin of public education in the 
United States, and then identifies the current role of public schools.  
This Part then explains how the Court has carefully considered the 
purpose of public education when analyzing the authority of public 
schools to punish students for their speech. 
A. Origin of Public Education and the Current Role of Public 
Schools 
Education is not a fundamental right provided by the United States 
Constitution.24  Nonetheless, the Supreme Court recognizes that it “is 
perhaps the most important function of state and local governments,”25 
playing “a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society.”26  
 
22. See, e.g., Mary-Rose Papandrea, Student Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 60 FLA. L. 
REV. 1027, 1090 (2008) (arguing that the Tinker standard cannot be applied to student 
Internet speech “because it gives schools far too much authority to restrict juvenile speech 
rights”); Joseph A. Tomain, Cyberspace Is Outside the Schoolhouse Gate: Offensive, Online 
Student Speech Receives First Amendment Protection, 59 DRAKE L. REV. 97, 159 (2010) 
(“Fraser does not create school jurisdiction over online speech—regardless of whether it is 
created or accessed on or off campus—because there is no captive audience and no need for a 
school to disassociate itself from the speech.”); Hoder, supra note 8, at 1594–95 (suggesting a 
“control and supervision test to determine school jurisdiction over students’ online speech”); 
Klupinski, supra note 14, at 647 (explaining how courts should think of student speech effect 
and content as variables on a graph and analyze where these variables intersect to determine 
if discipline was appropriate); Tuneski, supra note 6, at 142 (advocating for a bright-line rule 
that eliminates Internet speech originating off-campus from school sanctions “unless the 
speaker took additional, purposeful steps to ensure that the expression was disseminated at 
school”). 
23. See Bruce C. Hafen, Hazelwood School District and the Role of First Amendment 
Institutions, 1988 DUKE L.J. 685, 689 [hereinafter Hafen, First Amendment Institutions] 
(“These cases reason not from the premise that a school is a public forum for rational adults, 
but from the opposite premise that young students must have unusual protection against 
coercive influence on their beliefs precisely because they lack the rational capacity of 
adults.”). 
24. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (“Education, of 
course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution.  
Nor do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected.”). 
25. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
26. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982). 
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As this section addresses, public schools are valued by society because 
they teach not only fundamental academic skills that prepare students 
for future careers and higher education, but also instill in students a 
common set of core principles and values, such as respect, honesty, 
citizenship, responsibility, and integrity, which are necessary for our 
democratic nation to function.27 
After the American Revolution, education was perceived as a 
necessary function to maintain and strengthen the country’s newly 
formed system of self-government.28  Leaders recognized that a 
democratic society could be preserved only if its citizens were educated 
to understand the principles and practices of self-governance.29  As a 
result, public schools were established to teach students how to exercise 
their democratic rights as citizens and cultivate a sense of nationalism.30 
 
27. See Michael A. Resnick, Public Education—An American Imperative: Why Public 
Schools Are Vital to the Well-Being of Our Nation, POL’Y RES. BRIEF, Spring/Summer 2004, 
at 3.  
A democratic and free nation requires a people who value and practice certain 
principles in their society.  These principles include equality and freedom for all, 
social mobility and meritocracy, equal opportunity and self-governance, and respect 
for civil law and civic responsibility.  Despite our nation’s size and diversity, the 
American people have developed a shared vision and a common set of expectations 
about what living in a democratic and free society means.  
Id. 
28. Susan H. Bitensky, A Contemporary Proposal for Reconciling the Free Speech Clause 
with Curricular Values Inculcation in the Public Schools, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 769, 774 
(1995).  “[T]he attitude toward education after the American Revolution was that education 
was necessary to ‘build nationalism, to shape the good citizen, and to reform society.’”  
ROBERT M. HARDAWAY, AMERICA GOES TO SCHOOL: LAW, REFORM, AND CRISIS IN 
PUBLIC EDUCATION 70 (1995) (quoting JOEL SPRING, THE AMERICAN SCHOOL 1642–1990, 
at 30 (2d ed. 1990)). 
29. Bitensky, supra note 28, at 774–75; see GERALD L. GUTEK, EDUCATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 41–42 (1991) (explaining Thomas 
Jefferson’s belief that the country would “degenerate into mob rule” unless a majority of 
people received an education that emphasized civic virtues and responsibility); see also Bruce 
C. Hafen, Developing Student Expression Through Institutional Authority: Public Schools as 
Mediating Structures, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 663, 675 (1987) [hereinafter Hafen, Developing Student 
Expression] (“[E]ducation would create a needed sense of national unity, not only as a matter 
of patriotic loyalty, but as a matter of common understanding and language, forged in the 
egalitarian community of a public school inhabited by children of all classes and origins.”). 
30. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) (“[S]ome degree of education is 
necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our open political 
system if we are to preserve freedom and independence.  Further, education prepares 
individuals to be self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in society.”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 
262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (“The American people have always regarded education and 
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Today, our nation’s schools are much more diverse than in the post-
revolutionary days.31  The increased diversity in student bodies has led to 
conflicts between morality-based curriculum aimed at unifying the 
nation and rights-based individualism, which naturally springs from the 
multitude of racial, ethnic, and cultural backgrounds.32  Because of 
increased diversity, public schools have almost entirely eliminated 
morality-based curriculum.33  Modern public schools instead focus 
predominately on preparing students for higher education and the 
workforce;34 schools therefore emphasize skills acquisition in core 
subjects such as literacy and mathematics, foster creative and analytical 
thinking, and reinforce appropriate socialization skills.35  Nevertheless, 
the public school is still regarded as a unique place where students are 
 
acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme importance which should be diligently 
promoted.”); Curtis G. Bentley, Student Speech in Public Schools: A Comprehensive 
Analytical Framework Based on the Role of Public Schools in Democratic Education, 2009 
BYU EDUC. & L.J. 1, 23–24 (discussing Thomas Jefferson’s vision for education as a necessity 
to sustain self-government).  In order to foster democratic ideals through education, public 
school curriculum originally was aimed at teaching moral, work, and political values.  Michael 
A. Rebell, Schools, Values, and the Courts, 7 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 275, 280 (1989).  Moral 
values included honesty, generosity, charity, individualism, and self-reliance; work values 
included discipline, self-control, industriousness, and obedience; and political values included 
patriotism, democracy, and civic responsibility.  Id.  
31. See Rebell, supra note 30, at 283–84 (explaining that legal developments over the 
past one hundred twenty years—such as compulsory education statutes and school 
desegregation decrees—have diversified schools). 
32. Michael A. Rebell & Robert L. Hughes, Schools, Communities, and the Courts: A 
Dialogic Approach to Education Reform, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 99, 108 (1996).  
33. Id. at 108 (explaining that a major hurdle for achieving meaningful education reform 
is the disintegration of the values consensus forged during the nineteenth century); see Rebell, 
supra note 30, at 283–84 (discussing the dangers of inculcating a basic set of values in 
contemporary schools that have changed drastically due to modern trends such as 
urbanization, centralization, and individual rights assertion).  The inculcative model of public 
schools that dominated educational origins is opposed by critics who believe schools should 
serve as a “marketplace of ideas” that allow student free expression and thought.  See Kevin 
G. Welner, Locking up the Marketplace of Ideas and Locking Out School Reform: Courts’ 
Imprudent Treatment of Controversial Teaching in American’s Public Schools, 50 UCLA L. 
REV. 959, 966 (2003).  A comprehensive discussion on the two opposing educational theories 
is beyond the scope of this comment but is important to note.  
34. Resnick, supra note 27, at 4–5 (noting that the goal of public schools shifted in the 
1950s from “Americanizing a nation of immigrants and preparing an industrial workforce” to 
preparing students for higher education). 
35. VICTORIA J. DODD, PRACTICAL EDUCATION LAW FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 6–7 (2d ed. 2010). 
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able to learn the principles and practices of a democratic society.36 
Although commentators disagree about the methods schools should 
use to teach students, they generally agree that schools ought to teach 
students certain values.37  A school environment is ideal for this purpose 
because “[t]he hidden curriculum of the school has the potential to 
teach important lessons about authority, responsibility, caring, and 
respect.”38  In fact, “some inculcation of values in schools is inevitable.”39  
One critic of values inculcation in schools admits that “[i]t would be 
both practically and theoretically impossible to completely prevent the 
governmental values inculcation that occurs in the educational process; 
in certain instances, values inculcation is an inherent by-product of the 
educational process, and it would be absurd to hypothesize a vibrant 
democratic society absent such a process.”40  Thus, even though the 
methods may have changed, schools serve an important function in 
teaching students “the civic knowledge, skills, and dispositions necessary 
 
36. See Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 267, 318–24 (1991) (describing three concepts of public education: civic 
education, democratic education, and critical education). 
37. See, e.g., Bentley, supra note 30, at 4 (arguing that schools should “inculcat[e] in 
young students . . . the essential democratic values of nonrepression and nondiscrimination”); 
Rebell, supra note 30, at 289–92 (suggesting that values inculcation should be based on values 
important in a pluralistic society, which are discovered through participating in community 
dialogues and looking to the courts when there are conflicts); Martin H. Redish & Kevin 
Finnerty, What Did You Learn in School Today?: Free Speech, Values Inculcation, and the 
Democratic-Educational Paradox, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 62, 69–72 (2002) (advocating that 
values education should be based on an anti-indoctrination model, which conveys only those 
values that are related to the educational process); Richard L. Roe, Valuing Student Speech: 
The Work of the Schools as Conceptual Development, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 1269, 1292 (1991) 
(claiming that schools’ role in assisting students in development values should be based on a 
conceptual-development model, rather than values inculcation model, to better develop 
thinking skills). 
38. Nat’l Council for the Soc. Studies, Fostering Civic Virtue: Character Education in the 
Social Studies, 61 SOC. EDUC. 225, 226 (1997), available at http://www.socialstudies.org/positio
ns/character (“Teaching academic subjects and teaching character can be mutually reinforcing 
tasks.  Intellectual virtues such as patience, diligence, responsibility, reflectiveness, and 
honesty are critical to the development of each student's academic potential.  Thus, the 
teaching of personal virtue is often a contribution to the development of civic virtue.”). 
39. AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 53 (1987) (“Even if schools avoid all 
courses that deal explicitly with morality or civic education, they still engage in moral 
education by virtue of their . . . noncurricular practices that serve to develop moral attitudes 
and character in students.”); Welner, supra note 33, at 967. 
40. Redish & Finnerty, supra note 37, at 69; see Nat’l Council for the Soc. Studies, supra 
note 38, at 226. 
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to participate in, preserve, and strengthen our republic.”41 
Education has changed a lot since the post-Revolutionary era, but it 
is still viewed as an important vehicle through which young people learn 
the values required to be responsible citizens.42  Even though the United 
States Constitution does not refer to education, explicitly or implicitly,43 
each state acknowledges the fundamental role of education in its state 
constitution.44  For example, several state constitutions describe 
education as necessary or essential to preserve the rights and liberties of 
the people and the free government.45  In other states, the statutory 
provisions that provide for free public education identify that the 
purpose of education is, in part, to prepare individuals to be responsible, 
 
41. GUARDIAN OF DEMOCRACY: THE CIVIC MISSION OF SCHOOLS 8 (Jonathan Gould 
ed., 2011) [hereinafter GUARDIAN OF DEMOCRACY], available at http://www.servicelearning.
org/library/resource/9617 (discussing the importance of civic education and proposing six 
proven practices in civic learning). 
42. See id. at 15–23 (explaining various benefits of civic learning); U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 
ADVANCING CIVIC LEARNING AND ENGAGEMENT IN DEMOCRACY: A ROAD MAP AND 
CALL TO ACTION 2 (2012), available at http://www.ed.gov/sites/default/files/road-map-call-to-
action.pdf (calling for an “infus[ion] and enhance[ment] [of] civic learning and democratic 
engagement for all students throughout the American education system”). 
43. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
44. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1, cl. a (“The education of children is a fundamental 
value of the people of the State of Florida.”); IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1 (“The stability of a 
republican form of government depending mainly upon the intelligence of the people . . . .”); 
VA. CONST. art. I, § 15 (“[F]ree government rests, as does all progress, upon the broadest 
possible diffusion of knowledge . . . .”). 
45. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. 14, § 1 (“Intelligence and virtue being the safeguards of 
liberty and the bulwark of a free and good government . . . .”); IND. CONST. art. 8, § 1 
(“Knowledge and learning, generally diffused throughout a community, being essential to the 
preservation of a free government . . . .”); ME. CONST. art. VIII, pt. 1, § 1 (“A general 
diffusion of the advantages of education being essential to the preservation of the rights and 
liberties of the people . . . .”); MASS. CONST. pt. II, ch. V, § 2 (“Wisdom, and knowledge, as 
well as virtue, diffused generally among the body of the people, being necessary for the 
preservation of their rights and liberties . . . .”); MO. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a) (“A general 
diffusion of knowledge and intelligence being essential to the preservation of the rights and 
liberties of the people . . . .”); N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 83 (“Knowledge and learning, generally 
diffused through a community, being essential to the preservation of a free 
government . . . .”); N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (“A high degree of intelligence, patriotism, 
integrity and morality on the part of every voter in a government by the people being 
necessary in order to insure the continuance of that government and the prosperity and 
happiness of the people . . . .”); R.I. CONST. art. XII, § 1 (“The diffusion of knowledge, as well 
as of virtue among the people, being essential to the preservation of their rights and 
liberties . . . .”); TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (“A general diffusion of knowledge being essential 
to the preservation of the liberties and rights of the people . . . .”). 
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active citizens by promoting both civic values and good character.46 
Indeed, states recognize the important goal of teaching their youth 
the skills necessary to prepare students for college and careers,47 but 
they also give public schools the responsibility of instilling in its students 
the values of good character.48  To obtain these goals, school districts 
recognize that the school environment plays a critical role in ensuring 
that proper teaching and learning take place.49  Therefore, in their 
student handbooks and codes of conduct, several school districts have 
identified student behaviors that are punishable, but they also focus on 
promoting values that are required of responsible citizens.50  For 
example, in its Bill of Student Rights and Responsibilities, the New 
York City Department of Education “promotes responsible student 
behavior and an atmosphere of dignity and respect by establishing 
 
46. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 14.03.015 (2010) (“It is the policy of this state that the 
purpose of education is to help ensure that all students will succeed in their education and 
work, shape worthwhile and satisfying lives for themselves, exemplify the best values of 
society, and be effective in improving the character and quality of the world about them.”); 
OR. REV. STAT. § 329.015 (2011) (focusing on education as “a major civilizing influence on 
the development of a humane, responsible and informed citizenry . . . .”); TEX. EDUC. CODE 
ANN. § 4.001 (West 2006) (explaining that the mission of the public education system is 
“grounded on the conviction that a general diffusion of knowledge is essential for the welfare 
of this state and for the preservation of the liberties and rights of citizens” with a goal to 
“prepare students to be thoughtful, active citizens who have an appreciation for the basic 
values of our state and national heritage and who can understand and productively function 
in a free enterprise society”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 1 (2004) (declaring that education is 
necessary to maintain the state’s “constitutional form of government and its guarantees of 
political and civil rights” as well as to “keep Vermont’s democracy competitive and 
thriving”); WIS. STAT. § 118.01 (2009–2010) (requiring schools to teach students “[a]n 
understanding of the basic workings of all levels of government, including the duties and 
responsibilities of citizenship”).  
47. See, e.g., L.A. UNIFIED SCH. DIST., 2012–2015 STRATEGIC PLAN 3 [hereinafter 
STRATEGIC PLAN], available at http://home.lausd.net/apps/pages/index.jsp?uREC_ID=17874
4&type=d&pREC_ID=407679 (stating that the school district’s vision includes having its 
students “college-prepared and career-ready”). 
48. See DODD, supra note 35, at 6–7; GUARDIAN OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 41, at 15–
23. 
49. See PATRICIA ANNE DUNCAN PARRISH, A WAKE UP CALL FOR SCHOOLS: A NEW 
ORDER IN PUBLIC EDUCATION 39 (2010) ("Positive climate is the foundation for every 
effective school."); see, e.g., STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 47, at 3 (“Our job is to create 
conditions and environments for students to flourish and to build a culture of curiosity and a 
community of life-long learners.  Our vision is that every student will receive a quality 
education in a safe, caring environment, and will be college-prepared and career-ready.”). 
50. See, e.g., N.Y.C. DEP’T OF EDUC., CITYWIDE STANDARDS OF INTERVENTION AND 
DISCIPLINE MEASURES 1 (2012) [hereinafter N.Y.C. DEP’T OF EDUC.]. 
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guidelines to help students as they strive to become productive citizens 
in a diverse society.”51  As another example, Miami-Dade County Public 
Schools established a set of core values as essential to its commitment to 
helping students learn how “to participate as caring, responsible citizens 
in our nation’s democracy.”52 
From the beginning, education has been vital to preserving our 
nation.53  Because the principles associated with democracy—such as 
respect, honesty, citizenship, responsibility, and integrity—are not 
inherent, public schools are given the responsibility of promoting them.54  
All levels of government recognize this important responsibility.55  As 
the next section explains, the Supreme Court also recognizes this goal of 
public schools. 
B. Supreme Court Promotes the Educational Mission Through Student 
Speech Cases 
The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that the public 
school plays a dominant role in maintaining our democratic society.  For 
example, in Brown v. Board of Education, the Court described 
education as “the very foundation of good citizenship . . . [and] a 
principle instrument in awakening the child to cultural values[.]”56  
Similarly, the Court declared in Ambach v. Norwick that an imperative 
function of public schools is to prepare persons for citizenship and to 
preserve values.57  Since 1969, the Supreme Court has addressed four 
cases concerning students’ right to free speech within a public school.58  
In these cases, the Court identified the scope of the constitutional 
 
51. Id.  
52. MIAMI-DADE CNTY. PUB. SCH., CODE OF STUDENT CONDUCT: SECONDARY 4 
(2007–2008).  The values include citizenship, cooperation, fairness, honesty, integrity, 
kindness, pursuit of excellence, respect, and responsibility.  Id. 
53. See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text.  
54. See supra notes 45–50 and accompanying text.  See generally Resnick, supra note 27. 
55. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (“[E]ducation is perhaps the most 
important function of state and local governments.”); see supra notes 42, 44–45 and 
accompanying text; see, e.g., N.Y.C. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 50, at 1.  
56. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493. 
57. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979) (“The importance of public schools in 
the preparation of individuals for participation as citizens, and in the preservation of the 
values on which our society rests, long has been recognized by our decisions.”). 
58. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 
U.S. 260 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Tinker v. Des 
Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
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protection for student speech in light of the school’s role. 
The first case the Supreme Court heard concerning student speech 
was Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District.59  In 
that case, three students wore black armbands to school to represent 
their objections to the Vietnam War.60  The students were sent home 
from school after refusing to remove the armbands and suspended until 
they agreed to return without them.61  Proclaiming that neither teachers 
nor students “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or 
expression at the schoolhouse gate,”62 the Court held that the silent 
protest of the students was protected speech, and the actions taken by 
the school violated the Constitution.63   
In coming to its decision, the Court identified two colliding interests: 
the free exercise of students’ First Amendment rights and the authority 
of the schools to control conduct within the school.64  The Court quoted 
Justice Jackson, who explained: “That [schools] are educating the young 
for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional 
freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its 
source and teach youth to discount important principles of our 
government as mere platitudes.”65  Yet, the Court identified the “special 
characteristics of the school environment”66 and the school’s authority to 
control student conduct.67 
To ensure that students are allowed to express their opinions at 
school, while reaffirming the school’s ability to control conduct, the 
Court explained that a student’s right to speech and expression may not 
be regulated unless there is a showing that the speech or expression 
“materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or 
invasion of the rights of others . . . .”68  Read broadly, Tinker established 
 
59. Tinker, 393 U.S. 503. 
60. Id. at 504. 
61. Id.  
62. Id. at 506. 
63. Id. at 514.  The Court noted that suspending the students for armbands implicated 
“direct, primary First Amendment rights akin to ‘pure speech.’”  Id. at 508. 
64. Id. at 507. 
65. Id. (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943)). 
66. Id. at 506. 
67. See id. at 507 (“[T]he Court has repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming the 
comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials, consistent with fundamental 
constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the schools.”). 
68. Id. at 513. 
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a presumption that student speech or expression in school is 
constitutionally protected unless the school can reasonably show that 
the speech or expression caused—or will cause—a material disruption 
or invasion of rights.69 
The Supreme Court heard its second student speech case—Bethel 
School District No. 403 v. Fraser—seventeen years after Tinker.70  
Matthew Fraser, a high school student, was suspended from school for 
three days and his name was removed from a list of candidates to speak 
at commencement because he gave a “lewd” speech at a school-
sponsored assembly.71  The speech elicited a response from several 
students but did not cause any delays to the assembly program nor did it 
cause any other disruptions at school.72  Nevertheless, the school district 
maintained—and the Supreme Court agreed—that the school could 
punish Fraser because the school had an interest in protecting its 
students from lewd and offensive speech.73 
The Court, in reversing the decision of the district court and the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, noted the distinction between the 
political expression in Tinker—the “nondisruptive, passive expression of 
a political viewpoint”—and the lewd, sexual content of the speech in 
Fraser.74  The Court explained that an important objective of public 
 
69. Hafen, First Amendment Institutions, supra note 23, at 689.  But see Bentley, supra 
note 30, at 7–8 (providing examples of narrow interpretations of Tinker); Josh Davis & Josh 
Rosenberg, Government as Patron or Regulator in the Student Speech Cases, 83 ST. JOHN’S L. 
REV. 1047, 1072 n.149 (2009) (discussing the different interpretations of the Tinker rule). 
70. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
71. Id. at 677–78.  The lewd speech was a nomination of a fellow student for student 
office in which Matthew Fraser referred to the candidate in terms of a sexual metaphor:  
I know a man who is firm—he's firm in his pants, he's firm in his shirt, his character 
is firm—but most . . . of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel, is firm.  Jeff 
Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in.  If necessary, he'll take an 
issue and nail it to the wall.  He doesn't attack things in spurts—he drives hard, 
pushing and pushing until finally—he succeeds.  Jeff is a man who will go to the very 
end—even the climax, for each and every one of you.  So vote for Jeff for A.S.B. 
vice-president—he'll never come between you and the best our high school can be. 
Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
72. Fraser v. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403, 755 F.2d 1356, 1360 (9th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 478 
U.S. 675 (1986). 
73. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 680; see ANNE PROFFITT DUPRE, SPEAKING UP: THE 
UNINTENDED COSTS OF FREE SPEECH IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 43 (2009).  
74. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 680.  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, applying the Tinker 
standard, found that the speech was protected because it did not disrupt school activities.  
Fraser, 755 F.2d at 1360 (“In our view, a noisy response to the speech and sexually suggestive 
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school education is the teaching of “habits and manners of civility,” 
including tolerance of speech that expresses opposing or controversial 
ideas.75  However, a school need not tolerate speech that “undermine[s] 
the school’s basic educational mission,”76 such as speech that is lewd and 
vulgar.77 
The Court’s holding in Fraser did not overrule Tinker; rather, it 
“established that [Tinker’s] mode of analysis . . . is not absolute.”78  The 
decision demonstrates that public school students do not have the same 
First Amendment protections as adults in other settings.79  Moreover, 
the decision reflects the Court’s faith in public schools to decide how to 
teach students to “demonstrate the appropriate form of civil discourse 
and political expression by their conduct and deportment in and out of 
class.”80  As such, the Court established a balancing test: weighing the 
students’ freedom to express unpopular opinions against society’s 
interest of ensuring that students learn appropriate behaviors.81  As one 
commentator observed, the Court “believed that high school students 
could only learn about democratic values in a more disciplined 
atmosphere.  If they are able to learn these values while they are in 
 
movements by three students in a crowd of 600 fail to rise to the level of a material 
interference with the educational process that justifies impinging upon Fraser's First 
Amendment right to express himself freely.”).   
75. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681 (quoting CHARLES A. BEARD & MARY R. BEARD, THE 
BEARDS’ NEW BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 228 (1968)). 
76. Id. at 685. 
77. Id. at 685–86. 
78. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 405 (2007); see DUPRE, supra note 73, at 49; Hafen, 
First Amendment Institutions, supra note 23, at 690–91 (describing the Fraser decision as a 
“significant departure” from the material or substantial disruption test articulated in Tinker). 
79. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682 (citation omitted).  In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan 
noted: 
It is true, however, that the State has interests in teaching high school students how 
to conduct civil and effective public discourse and in avoiding disruption of 
educational school activities.  Thus, the Court holds that under certain 
circumstances, high school students may properly be reprimanded for giving a 
speech at a high school assembly which school officials conclude disrupted the 
school’s educational mission.  Respondent’s speech may well have been protected 
had he given it in school but under different circumstances, where the school’s 
legitimate interests in teaching and maintaining civil public discourse were less 
weighty. 
Id. at 688–98 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
80. Id. at 683 (majority opinion). 
81. Id. at 681. 
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school, they will be better able to understand their importance to the 
self-preservation of the nation when they become adults.”82 
The Court’s holding in Fraser has caused significant confusion 
among courts and commentators alike.83  Read narrowly and literally, 
Fraser stands for an exception to Tinker’s material disruption analysis: a 
school may regulate speech in classrooms or at school-sponsored events 
if it is lewd, vulgar, or obscene—no disruption is needed.84  However, 
Fraser has also been interpreted more broadly as recognizing that it is 
within the school’s discretion to regulate student speech if the school 
finds that the speech is “inconsistent with its ‘basic educational 
mission.’”85 
Two years after Fraser, the Supreme Court formulated another 
“test” in its third student speech case, Hazelwood School District v. 
Kuhlmeier.86  In this case, the school principal omitted two articles 
written by student-staff members of the school newspaper.87  One article, 
featuring three students’ experiences with pregnancy, was removed 
because the principal was concerned that the identities of the girls in the 
article would become known.88  The principal also believed that “the 
 
82. DUPRE, supra note 73, at 49. 
83. See Davis & Rosenberg, supra note 69, at 1074–75 & n.161 (explaining that Fraser 
confused Tinker’s already ambiguous holding and has left many questions unanswered); 
Brannon P. Denning & Molly C. Taylor, Morse v. Frederick and the Regulation of Student 
Cyberspeech, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 835, 839 (2008) (“Fraser did not, however, explicitly 
hold that it was altering or adding to Tinker’s inquiry.”); see also Bitensky, supra note 28, at 
814 (noting that the Fraser decision answers whether schools may regulate speech to instill 
nonpolitical values but it also created ambiguity and left many questions unanswered).  An 
analysis of the extent of confusion is beyond the scope of this comment.  For purposes of this 
comment, it is sufficient to understand the two dominant approaches to Fraser. 
84. See Tomain, supra note 22, at 104 (“Fraser holds that three factors are important for 
schools to assert jurisdiction over student speech: (1) there must be a captive audience; (2) the 
speech must involve lewd or indecent sexual content; and (3) the school must have a need to 
disassociate itself from the speech.”). 
85. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (quoting Fraser, 478 
U.S. at 685); see Bentley, supra note 30, at 9 (noting that, despite ultimately being decided 
based on the speech’s vulgarity, “the opinion contained numerous statements by the Court 
regarding the appropriateness of deferring to educational authorities in matters relating to 
the educational mission of schools”); Hafen, First Amendment Institutions, supra note 23, at 
691 (“Fraser rested on a more substantial foundation than the vulgarity of the student 
speaker’s language . . . .”). 
86. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272–73. 
87. Id. at 263. 
88. Id.  The story used false names, but the principal was concerned that they may 
nonetheless be identified from the text.  Id. 
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article’s references to sexual activity and birth control were 
inappropriate for some of the younger students.”89  The other article 
removed from the newspaper discussed students’ experiences with 
parental divorce.90  The principal removed that article because he 
thought the parents identified in the article should have been given an 
opportunity to respond to the remarks about them or to consent to 
publication.91  The students contended that by omitting two articles from 
the school newspaper, the school violated their First Amendment 
rights.92 
Like Tinker and Fraser, the decision in Hazelwood was based upon 
balancing the First Amendment rights of students against the 
educational mission of the public school.  The Court accepted that the 
principal’s decision to delete the articles was a reasonable one, and 
therefore it found no violation of the students’ First Amendment 
rights.93  In doing so, the Court rejected the idea that a school-sponsored 
newspaper was a public forum open to “indiscriminate use” by the 
students because the newspaper was intended to be a learning 
experience.94  More importantly, the Court differentiated students’ 
personal expression from expression that the “public might reasonably 
perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school.”95 
Focusing again on the role of educators as imparting knowledge 
about cultural values as well as traditional academia,96 the Court in 
 
89. Id. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. at 264. 
93. Id. at 276. 
94. Id. at 270 (citation omitted). 
95. Id. at 271 (“Educators are entitled to exercise greater control over this second form 
of student expression to assure that participants learn whatever lessons the activity is 
designed to teach, that readers or listeners are not exposed to material that may be 
inappropriate for their level of maturity, and that the views of the individual speaker are not 
erroneously attributed to the school.”).  As one commentator observed,  
[The majority opinion] pointed out that in Tinker the Court addressed whether a 
school was required to tolerate student speech—a matter of the student’s personal 
expression.  In Hazelwood, the question was whether the school was required 
affirmatively to promote particular student speech that occurred in activities the 
school sponsored, like newspaper publications, theater productions, and other 
expressive activities. 
DUPRE, supra note 73, at 89. 
96. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272 (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 
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Hazelwood concluded that schools may censor student publications that 
are reasonably related to “legitimate pedagogical concerns.”97  The court 
suggested that if schools were unable to disassociate themselves from 
certain student speech, they “would be unduly constrained from 
fulfilling their role as ‘principal instrument[s] in awakening the child to 
cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in 
helping him to adjust normally to his environment.’”98 
Like Tinker and Fraser, Hazelwood has been interpreted in several 
ways.99  However, the standard most often attributed to the Hazelwood 
decision is that schools have discretion in regulating school-sponsored 
speech that takes place in a school-sponsored forum if the regulation 
reasonably relates to the school’s educational mission.100 
The final student speech case heard by the Supreme Court was 
Morse v. Frederick.101  In Morse, the school permitted its students to 
observe the Olympic Torch Relay, which passed through the town along 
a street in front of the school.102  Students viewed the relay from either 
side of the street, off school grounds.103  Joseph Frederick, who had been 
late to school that day, joined his friends on the street across from the 
school and unfolded a banner bearing the phrase “BONG HiTS 4 
JESUS” as the torch bearers and camera crews passed by.104  Frederick 
refused to take down the banner until the principal confiscated it, and 
he was suspended from school for ten days.105  The Court declared that 
 
(1954)). 
97. Id. at 272–73. 
98. Id. at 272 (quoting Brown, 347 U.S. at 493 (1954)); see Hafen, First Amendment 
Institutions, supra note 23, at 685 (suggesting that Hazelwood actually strengthens rather than 
weakens students’ First Amendment protections because it recognizes schools as tools to help 
students “develop their own educated capacity for self-expression”). 
99. See Emily Gold Waldman, Returning to Hazelwood’s Core: A New Approach to 
Restrictions on School-Sponsored Speech, 60 FLA. L. REV. 63, 90 (2008) (identifying that 
different circuit courts are reaching different conclusions about the boundaries of Hazelwood 
in relation to viewpoint related restrictions and the rationales used when applying the case to 
decide student-speech issues). 
100. See, e.g., Hafen, First Amendment Institutions, supra note 23, at 693–94; Adam K. 
Nalley, Note, Did Student Speech Get Thrown Out with the Banner? Reading “Bong Hits 4 
Jesus” Narrowly to Uphold Important Constitutional Protections for Students, 46 HOUS. L. 
REV. 615, 640 (2009). 
101. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
102. Id. at 397.  
103. Id. 
104. Id.  
105. Id. at 398. 
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the “special circumstances of the school environment”106 combined with 
the governmental interests to prevent drug abuse gives schools 
discretion to regulate speech that promotes drug use.107  Thus, the Court 
concluded that Frederick’s expression was not protected speech because 
it could reasonably be viewed as promoting illegal drug use during a 
school-sponsored event.108 
The Court’s decision in Morse has been viewed by commentators as 
a constitutional dead end—that it applies only when schools censor 
speech that can be “reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use.”109  
However, lower courts have construed the opinion to be about the 
schools’ concerns for the health and safety of its students. 110  The case 
has also been viewed as expanding a school’s authority to discipline 
student speech that occurs off-campus.111 
The Supreme Court’s decisions in each of the four student speech 
cases appear to impart a rather narrow test specific to the particular 
facts.  Nonetheless, the Court’s underlying analysis, which considers the 
school’s educational mission, has remained consistent when determining 
the constitutionality of student speech regulation.  Critics of the Court’s 
decisions argue that limiting student speech in schools—when it could 
not be limited if otherwise not in a school setting—is wholly contrary to 
the school’s democratic mission and our country’s commitment to the 
exercise of the First Amendment.112 
 
106. Id. at 408 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 
(1969)). 
107. Id. 
108. Id. at 410. 
109. Id. at 403; see Clay Calvert, Misuse and Abuse of Morse v. Frederick by Lower 
Courts: Stretching the High Court’s Ruling Too Far to Censor Student Expression, 32 SEATTLE 
U. L. REV. 1, 1–3 (2008) (discussing why the Court’s holding “was perceived as being 
constricted and limited by both its quirky, if not unique, set of facts about the display of a 
banner conveying the message ‘Bong Hits 4 Jesus’”). 
110. See Calvert, supra note 109, at 12–21 (analyzing how Morse has been applied by 
lower courts to support suppression of violent and homophobic speech in schools). 
111. See, e.g., Klupinski, supra note 14, at 615 (“[A]lthough the Court avoided the issue 
of whether schools can proscribe speech that originated off school property by deeming the 
banner ‘school speech,’ the Morse decision helps expand a school’s authority to discipline 
students for off-campus speech.”) 
112. See DUPRE, supra note 73, at 2 (illustrating the “paradox” of school speech); see 
also Morse, 551 U.S. at 423 (Alito, J., concurring) (“The ‘educational mission’ argument 
would give public school authorities a license to suppress speech on political and social issues 
based on disagreement with the viewpoint expressed.  The argument, therefore, strikes at the 
very heart of the First Amendment.”). 
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However, other commentators and the Court have attempted to 
dispel this argument by discussing the “special characteristics of the 
school environment.”113  For instance, the Court acknowledged that even 
though students do not lose their constitutional rights while they are at 
school,114 their rights while at school “are not automatically coextensive 
with the rights of adults in other settings.”115  The Court cited reasons for 
this unique treatment of public school children such as the maturity 
levels of the students116 and the necessity of teachers to be able to 
control the conduct of their students in order to effectively impart 
knowledge.117 
Furthermore, limiting student expression in schools may actually 
assist students in understanding their democratic rights more than if 
children in schools were free to express whatever they desired.118  As one 
commentator has observed, because children have a diminished capacity 
to make meaningful decisions—a fact that has been implicated in 
decisions such as the establishment of a minimum voting age of eighteen 
and prohibition of prayer in public schools—they do not have the 
capacity to meaningfully express themselves.119  Until they develop this 
capacity, any restraint on their expression is limited in value.120  Thus, 
appropriate restraint on student speech can effectively promote rather 
than contradict important democratic values that are necessary to 
prepare students to become effective citizens in society. 
However, the Supreme Court’s decisions regarding student speech 
arguably have caused more confusion than guidance for schools dealing 
with student speech issues.  Lower courts have attempted to apply the 
four principles generated from the decisions to student speech cases 
 
113. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist, 393 U.S. 503, 506. (1969). 
114. Id.  
115. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986) (citation omitted). 
116. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988); Fraser, 478 U.S. at 
683. 
117. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507. 
118. See Hafen, First Amendment Institutions, supra note 23, at 699–700 (arguing that the 
long held belief of minimal intervention in student expression does not enhance children’s 
“most fundamental interest in first amendment values”). 
119. See id. (“Until children have developed this freedom ‘for expression,’ their freedom 
‘from restrains on expression’ has only limited value.” (quoting Hafen, Developing Student 
Expression, supra note 29, at 666)). 
120. Id. at 700; see also Bentley, supra note 30, at 31 (suggesting that when children are 
simply left without guidance and hierarchical instruction, they are unable to choose the 
fundamental democratic values because they lack adequate moral reasoning). 
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with significantly different fact scenarios.121  The result has been an 
aggregate of differing interpretations.122  One of the more difficult 
student speech scenarios the lower courts have grappled with is student 
speech on the Internet that originated off-campus and involves the 
school or school personnel.123  The Supreme Court cases have not 
examined student speech that occurs off-campus, speech that exists on 
the Internet, or speech that is directed at the school or school officials.  
The next Part examines these lower court decisions more in depth. 
III. LOWER COURTS’ APPLICATION OF PRECEDENT TO ONLINE 
SPEECH 
Student speech cases seem to involve a sort of balancing approach: 
balancing a school’s interests in maintaining order and fulfilling its role 
as an educational institution with the student’s right to freedom of 
expression.124  Even before the use of the Internet, lower courts 
struggled with determining where the balance tipped when schools 
disciplined students for off-campus expression directed at school and 
school authorities.125  Although the location of the speech as either off-
campus or on-campus was relatively easy to determine—a decision 
based on the geographic location of where the student created the 
expression—courts were left unguided when off-campus expression was 
brought on school grounds.126  The use of the Internet for student 
expression has only muddled the issue further, as shown by the 
inconsistencies in lower court decisions.  Below are examples of lower 
court decisions where students created expression on the Internet and 
the various standards the lower courts have applied to decide them. 
  
 
121. See discussion infra Part III. 
122. See discussion infra Part III. 
123. See, e.g., J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847 (Pa. 2002). 
124. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
125. See J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. (Snyder II), 650 F.3d 915, 937 
(3rd. Cir. 2011) (en banc) (Smith, J., concurring) (“Lower courts . . . are divided on whether 
Tinker’s substantial-disruption test governs students’ off-campus expression.”); supra note 81 
and accompanying text.  
126. Compare, e.g., Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1044–45 (2d Cir. 1979) 
(holding that the school exceeded its authority by disciplining students for distributing 
satirical newsletter created off-campus), with Boucher v. Sch. Bd., 134 F.3d 821, 829 (7th Cir. 
1998) (upholding school’s authority to punish a student who published an underground 
newsletter describing how to hack into the school’s computers). 
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A. Internet Speech Originating Off-Campus: Cases Favorable for the 
School 
Without a Supreme Court ruling on how to handle student 
expression on the Internet, some courts have underscored the Court’s 
emphasis on the educational mission of the schools to determine the 
constitutionality of disciplining student Internet speech.127  For example, 
in J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area School District, an eighth-grader 
created a website on his home computer entitled “Teacher Sux.”128  The 
website contained several web pages of offensive comments and images 
about the principal and some of the teachers at the student’s school.129 
Other students at school viewed the website, and eventually a 
teacher at the middle school learned of the website and reported it to 
the principal.130  Interpreting the website as containing a serious threat to 
the school, the principal contacted the local police and the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation to identify the creator of the website.131  Mrs. 
Fulmer developed numerous psychological symptoms as a result of 
feeling threatened and was granted a medical leave of absence, which 
required the school to hire three substitute teachers.132  The website even 
caused a “demoralizing impact on the school community,” which the 
court described as comparable to the death of a student or staff 
member.133 
After the School Board voted to expel J.S. for statements he made 
on the website, J.S. argued that his First Amendment rights were 
violated by the School District.134  The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
 
127. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847. 
128. Id. at 850–51. 
129. Id. at 851.  The website was particularly aimed at J.S.’s algebra teacher, Mrs. 
Fulmer.  Id.  For example, the site contained a web page titled “Why Should [Mrs. Fulmer] 
Die?” and elicited $20 from readers to help pay for a hitman.  Id.  On his site, J.S. depicted 
Mrs. Fulmer as Adolf Hitler, included a drawing of Mrs. Fulmer’s head severed from her 
body, and repeated 136 times “F____ You Mrs. Fulmer.  You are a B____.  You Are A Stupid 
B____.”  Id.  Additionally, the website expressed that the school’s principal was having sexual 
relations with a principal from another school.  Id. 
130. Id. at 851–52.  Even though there was a disclaimer on the website stating that by 
clicking on it and entering the website the visitor agrees that he is not employed by the school 
district and will not tell any school district employees about the website, anyone was able to 
access the website.  Id. at 851. 
131. Id. at 852. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. at 853. 
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affirmed both the trial court’s and the Commonwealth Court’s decisions 
to uphold the Board’s decision to expel him.135  Deciding first whether 
the speech was considered to be on or off-campus speech, the court 
found that a sufficient nexus existed between the website and the school 
campus to characterize the speech as an on-campus expression.136  The 
court acknowledged that the website was created off-campus, but held 
that it was on-campus speech because it was aimed at the school and 
school personnel and was accessed at school by J.S.137 
After determining that the speech was indeed on-campus, the court 
recognized that the facts of the case made applying any of the Supreme 
Court precedents for analyzing student speech difficult.138  The court, 
however, in focusing on “the unique needs of the school setting and 
concern for the school’s education mission,”139 applied a combination of 
Tinker and Fraser.140  Because the language on the website was “lewd, 
vulgar, and plainly offensive,”141 it undermined the school’s basic 
educational mission.142  Further, because schools must control conduct 
within the school environment, the disruption that the website caused 
within the school was substantial enough for the school to discipline J.S. 
for the content of the website.143 
Courts have also determined the constitutionality of disciplining 
Internet speech by examining the likelihood that the speech would reach 
campus and cause a material or substantial disruption in the learning 
environment.  In Wisniewski v. Board of Education,144 an eighth-grade 
student created an instant messaging icon on his parents’ computer that 
identified him when he messaged his “buddies” on AOL.145  The icon 
 
135. Id. at 869. 
136. Id. at 865. 
137. Id.  “We hold that where speech that is aimed at a specific school and/or its 
personnel is brought onto the school campus or accessed at school by its originator, the 
speech will be considered on-campus speech.”  Id. 
138. See id. at 865–66 (explaining why Tinker, Fraser, and Hazelwood do not provide 
adequate guidelines to determine whether J.S.’s speech is protected). 
139. Id. at 868. 
140. Id. at 866 (“In essence, the type of speech at issue in this case straddles the political 
speech in Tinker, and the lewd and offensive speech expressed at an official school assembly 
in Fraser.”).  
141. Id. at 868. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. at 868–69. 
144. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007). 
145. Id. at 35. 
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was a depiction of a person’s head being shot by a pistol, with the words 
“Kill Mr. VanderMolen”146 beneath it.147  A classmate of Wisniewski 
informed Mr. VanderMolen of the depiction and brought a copy of the 
icon to school to show him.148  Wisniewski was originally suspended for 
five days,149 but after a superintendent’s meeting, his suspension was 
increased to the entire first semester of the school year.150 
The court declined to analyze the facts of the case under a “true 
threat” analysis.151  Rather, applying Tinker, the court held that the 
speech was not protected because the school reasonably predicted that 
the icon would create a risk of material or substantial disruption.152  
Even though Wisniewski created the icon on his home computer and did 
not intend for the icon to come to the attention of the school, the 
threatening nature of the icon and the distribution of it to at least fifteen 
classmates created a foreseeable risk that the icon would be made 
known to the school and would cause a disruption therein.153  The court 
emphasized its view that conduct that reasonably causes a foreseeable 
risk of disruption within the school—regardless of intent or origin—can 
be disciplined by the school.154 
Courts have also upheld schools’ decisions to punish students for 
speech causing disruption to the activities of school administrators.  For 
example, in Doninger v. Niehoff, the Second Circuit upheld a school’s 
decision to discipline a student for her speech on the Internet.155  Avery 
Doninger, a high school junior, was a member of Student Council and 
 
146. Mr. VanderMolen was Wisniewski’s teacher at the time.  Id. at 36. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. at 37. 
151. Id. at 37–38.  A true threat analysis requires a court to determine “whether a 
reasonable person would interpret the purported threat as a serious expression of an intent to 
cause a present or future harm.”  Doe v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 622 
(8th Cir. 2002).  See generally Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (recognizing that 
threats of violence are not protected by the First Amendment).  The Wisniewski Court noted 
that despite the practice of other courts to assess a student’s statements concerning killing 
school officials against the “true ‘threat’” standard, it believed that the school had “broader 
authority to sanction student speech” than allowed under a true threat analysis.  Wisniewski, 
494 F.3d at 38.  
152. Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 38–39. 
153. Id. at 39–40. 
154. Id. at 40. 
155. Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 43–44 (2d Cir. 2008). 
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served as the Junior Class Secretary.156  While attempting to finalize the 
scheduling of an annual event—Jamfest—Doninger and other members 
of the student council sent out an email to the broader community 
asking for help to persuade the district superintendent to hold Jamfest 
on the date and at the location they wanted.157  The superintendent and 
the school’s principal received “an influx of telephone calls and emails” 
from the email recipients who were concerned about the scheduling of 
the event.158  The principal expressed her disappointment in Doninger, 
and—according to Doninger—told her that Jamfest was going to be 
cancelled altogether.159 
Later that evening, Doninger published her frustrations on her 
public blog on livejournal.com:160 
[J]amfest is cancelled due to douchebags in central office.  [H]ere 
is an email that we sent to a ton of people and asked them to 
forward to everyone in their address book to help get support for 
jamfest.  [B]asically, because we sent it out, Paula Schwartz is 
getting a TON of phone calls and emails and such.  [W]e have so 
much support and we really appriciate [sic] it.  [H]owever, she 
got pissed off and decided to just cancel the whole thing all 
together.  [A]nddd [sic] so basically we aren’t going to have it at 
all, but in the slightest chance we do it is going to be after the 
talent show on [M]ay 18th.  [A]ndd [sic] here is the letter we sent 
out to parents. 
. . . . 
And here is a letter my mom sent to Paula [Schwartz] and cc’d 
Karissa [Niehoff] to get an idea of what to write if you want to 
write something or call her to piss her off more.  [I’m] down.161 
The principal and superintendent each received more phone calls 
 
156. Id. at 44. 
157. Id. 
158. Id. 
159. Id. at 44–45.  Doninger claimed that the school’s principal told her the event was 
cancelled; however, the district court gave credit to the principal’s testimony, claiming she 
never told Doninger that the event was cancelled.  Id. 
160. Id. at 45.  Livejournal.com is a “community publishing platform” where users are 
able to blog as well as network with one another.  See Our Company, LIVEJOURNAL, 
http://www.livejournalinc.com/aboutus.php (last visited Nov. 16, 2012). 
161. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 45.  The post also contained copies of the email that the 
Student Council members sent earlier that day as well as a copy of the email Doninger’s 
mother had wrote to the superintendent concerning the conflict.  Id. 
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and emails concerning Jamfest the next day at school.162  The school’s 
principal decided that Doninger’s conduct was inconsistent with the 
“civility and good citizenship expected of class officers,” and she 
prohibited Doninger from running for Senior Class Secretary.163 
The Second Circuit Court applied the Tinker standard164—rejecting 
the Fraser exception because the blog was written off school 
grounds165—and concluded that the school did not violate Doninger’s 
First Amendment rights by disqualifying her from running for Senior 
Class Secretary.166  The court used the framework developed in its 
decision in Wisniewski167 to conclude that although she created the blog 
post off-campus, Doninger meant for it to reach school grounds.168  
Further, the court found that the post created a reasonably foreseeable 
risk of substantial disruption in the school.169  Three factors the court 
focused on in coming to its conclusion were (1) the language Doninger 
used in her post requesting her readers to call the principal and 
superintendant was “disruptive of efforts to resolve the ongoing 
controversy,”170 (2) the misleading—if not false—information Doninger 
used claiming that Jamfest had been cancelled altogether caused 
frustration in the school community and was likely to cause more 
disruption to the school administrators and teachers,171 and (3) the 
discipline was appropriate since it related to Doninger’s role as a 
member of student council.172 
Finally, at least one court has analyzed a student speech case without 
referring to any of the Supreme Court precedents.  In Barnett ex rel. 
 
162. Id. at 46. 
163. Id.  Doninger was not permitted to be on the ballot or to campaign for Senior Class 
Secretary, yet she received a plurality of the votes as a write-in candidate.  Id.  However, she 
was not permitted to accept the nomination for office.  Id. 
164. Id. at 50. 
165. See id. at 49 (“To be clear, Fraser does not justify restricting a student’s speech 
merely because it is inconsistent with an educator’s sensibilities . . . .  [H]ad it occurred in the 
classroom, [Doninger’s speech] would have fallen within Fraser and its recognition that 
nothing in the First Amendment prohibits school authorities from discouraging inappropriate 
language in the school environment.”). 
166. Id. at 53. 
167. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007). 
168. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 50. 
169. Id.  
170. Id. at 50–51. 
171. Id. at 51. 
172. Id. at 52. 
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Barnett v. Tipton County Board of Education,173 two high school students 
were disciplined for creating fake MySpace profiles of the assistant 
principal and a coach of the high school.174  The profile of the assistant 
principal, which contained sexually suggestive comments directed 
towards female students, was brought to the school’s attention by a 
concerned parent and a local reporter who both believed the profile to 
be authentic.175  In holding that the school did not violate the students’ 
First Amendment rights, the court did not analyze the case under Tinker 
or any of the other Supreme Court cases;176 rather, the court held that 
the speech in the profiles was not protected by the First Amendment 
because the profiles were not parodies.177  The court further denied 
allegations that the school violated the students’ due process rights 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.178  Thus, similar to Wisniewski, 
Doninger, and J.S., the Barnett court affirmed the state’s interest in 
deterring speech that poses a risk for substantial disruption in favor of 
the school’s interest in furthering its educational mission. 
B. Internet Speech Originating Off-Campus: Cases Favorable for the 
Students 
Conversely, some courts have held in favor of protecting student 
speech.  Often, when a court holds that a school violated a student’s free 
expression rights by punishing the student for content on the Internet, 
the court will find that the Internet expression—unless constituting a 
threat—did not create a reasonably foreseeable risk of substantial 
disruption within a school.179  In Beussink ex rel. Beussink v. Woodland 
R-IV School District,180 for example, Brandon Beussink was disciplined 
 
173. Barnett ex rel. Barnett v. Tipton Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 601 F. Supp. 2d. 980 (W.D. 
Tenn. 2009). 
174. Id. at 982–83. 
175. Id. 
176. Id. at 984. 
177. Id.  Parodies are protected by the First Amendment if they “involve speech that 
cannot ‘reasonably be understood as describing actual facts about [the subject of the 
parody].’”  Id. (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 57 (1988)). 
178. Barnett, 601 F. Supp. 2d at 985. 
179. See, e.g., Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 216, 219 
(3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012); Snyder II, 650 F.3d 915, 930–31 
(3d Cir. 2011) (en banc); Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1374 (S.D. Fla. 2010); 
Beussink ex rel. Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1181 (E.D. Mo. 
1998). 
180. Beussink, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175. 
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for creating a webpage that criticized the school, the principals, and the 
teachers.181  The webpage contained “vulgar language” used to criticize 
the school and invited readers to contact the school to voice their 
concerns—though there is no evidence that anyone actually contacted 
the school.182  
The court used Tinker’s material and substantial disruption test to 
decide whether the school was justified in limiting the student’s 
speech.183  It balanced the harm to Beussink if his discipline was upheld 
against the harm to the school if the discipline was found to be in 
violation of Beussink’s rights.184  The court found that the school 
violated Beussink’s free speech rights because the website caused no 
actual or reasonable fear of substantial disruption to the school.185  
Additionally, the court defined the speech as an unpopular opinion and 
identified it as the type of speech that the First Amendment was 
designed to protect.186 
Similar to the analysis in Beussink was the court’s analysis in Evans 
v. Bayer.187  In this case, Katherine Evans was a high school senior who 
created a group on Facebook entitled, “Ms. Sarah Phelps is the worst 
teacher I’ve ever met,” as a place for her and other students to “express 
[their] feelings of hatred” for the teacher.188  Evans created the group 
page on her home computer and removed it after two days, but she was 
nevertheless disciplined by the school principal after he became aware 
of the page.189 
In holding that the school violated Evans’ First Amendment rights,190 
the court first recognized that off-campus speech could “raise[] on-
 
181. Id. at 1177–78. 
182. Id. at 1177. 
183. Id. at 1180; see Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 
(1969). 
184. Beussink, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 1181. 
185. Id.  
186. Id. at 1182.  The court explained that the school principal disciplined Beussink 
because the content of the webpage upset him, rather than for fear that the speech would 
cause a disturbance to the school environment.  Id. at 1180. 
187. Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365 (S.D. Fla. 2010). 
188. Id. at 1367.  The webpage contained Phelps’ picture, and only three postings, all in 
support of Phelps, appeared on the page from other students.  Id.  Phelps never saw the 
webpage.  Id. 
189. Id. 
190. Id. at 1376–77. 
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campus concerns.”191  Although the off-campus speech in this instance 
was aimed at the school, the court held that the direction of the speech 
was not, by itself, sufficient to define the speech as on-campus.192  
Further, the court explained that the speech was protected because “[i]t 
was an opinion of a student about a teacher, that was published off-
campus, did not cause any disruption on-campus, and was not lewd, 
vulgar, threatening, or advocating illegal or dangerous behavior.”193  As 
a result, absent a showing of a foreseeable threat of disruption, the court 
refused to allow regulation of student Internet speech simply because 
the target audience was in whole or in part on-campus. 
Recently, the Third Circuit decided two similar cases en banc.  In J.S. 
ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District,194 eighth-graders J.S. and 
her friend, K.L., created a fake MySpace profile of their principal, Mr. 
McGonigle, using J.S.’s home computer.195  The profile did not include 
McGonigle’s real name, school, or location, but instead characterized 
him as a bi-sexual forty-year-old middle school principal named “m-
hoe=]” who lived in Alabama with his wife and child.196  The profile did 
feature his photograph, which was copied and pasted from the school 
district’s website.197  In the “Interests” section of the webpage, the girls 
included things such as “being a tight ass,”198 “riding the fraintrain 
[sic],”199 and “hitting on students and their parents.”200  Additionally, the 
“About Me” section of the webpage read: 
HELLO CHILDREN[.] yes. [I]t’s your oh so wonderful, hairy, 
expressionless, sex addict, fagass, put on this world with a small 
dick PRINCIPAL[.]  I have come to [MySpace] so I can pervert 
 
191. Id. at 1370. 
192. See id. at 1371. 
193. Id. at 1374. 
194. Snyder II, 650 F.3d 915 (3rd Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
195. Id. at 920.  The profile’s URL was http://www.myspace.com/kidsrockmybed.  J.S. ex 
rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. (Snyder I), 593 F.3d 286, 291 (3rd Cir. 2010), vacated, 
reh’g granted en banc, 650 F.3d 915 (3rd Cir. 2011). 
196. Snyder I, 593 F.3d at 291 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
197. Id. 
198. Id. (quoting 2 Appendix on Behalf of Appellants at A38, Snyder I, 593 F.3d. 286 
(3rd Cir. 2010) (No. 08-4138)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
199. Id. (quoting 2 Appendix on Behalf of Appellants, supra note 198, at A38) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Debra Frain is Mr. McGonigle’s wife and one of the school’s 
guidance counselors.  Id. at 291 n.2. 
200. Id. at 291 (quoting 2 Appendix on Behalf of Appellants, supra note 198, at A38) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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the minds of other principal’s [sic] to be just like me.  I know, I 
know, you’re all thrilled[.]  Another reason I came to [MySpace] 
is because—I am keeping an eye on you students (who[m] I care 
for so much)[.]  For those who want to be my friend, and aren’t 
in my school[,] I love children, sex (any kind), dogs, long walks 
on the beach, tv, being a dick head, and last but not least my 
darling wife who looks like a man (who satisfies my needs) MY 
FRAINTRAIN[.]  [S]o please, feel free to add me, message me 
whatever[.]201 
Originally appearing as a “public” profile, “M-hoe’s” profile page 
was made “private” by J.S. after several students approached her at 
school on the day after the page was created.202  No students viewed the 
profile while at school—Blue Mountain School District blocked 
computer access to MySpace—but access was granted to about twenty-
two students who attended school in the district after requesting 
“friend” status.203  When Mr. McGonigle learned about the profile page 
and its creator,204 he showed it to the school district’s superintendent and 
the Director of Technology, as well as two guidance counselors.205  He 
eventually punished J.S. and K.L. with ten days out-of-school 
suspension.206  Further, Mr. McGonigle contacted MySpace, Inc., to have 
the profile removed, and he called the local police station to inquire 
about whether he could take personal legal action.207 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that the 
school violated J.S.’s First Amendment free speech rights by punishing 
her for creating the profile of Mr. McGonigle.208 Rejecting the 
applicability of Fraser to the case,209 the court applied the Tinker analysis 
 
201. Snyder II, 650 F.3d 915, 921 (3rd. Cir. 2011) (en banc) (alterations in original) 
(quoting 2 Appendix on Behalf of Appellants at A38, Snyder II, 650 F.3d. 915 (3rd Cir. 2011) 
(No. 08-4138)). 
202. Id. 
203. Id. 
204. Id. (explaining that Mr. McGonigle learned about the profile from another student 
and asked the student to bring him a printout of the profile page). 
205. Id. 
206. Id. at 922. 
207. Snyder I, 593 F.3d 286, 293 (3rd Cir. 2010), vacated, reh’g granted en banc, 650 F.3d 
915 (3rd Cir. 2011).  
208. Snyder II, 650 F.3d at 931. 
209. See id. at 932 (“Fraser’s ‘lewdness’ standard cannot be extended to justify a school’s 
punishment of J.S. for use of profane language outside the school, during non-school hours.”). 
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when deciding that the “School District could [not] have reasonably 
forecasted a substantial disruption of or material interference with the 
school as a result of J.S.’s profile.”210  The court explained that the 
profile could not be seen as potentially causing a substantial or material 
disruption because it was created as a joke and “was so outrageous that 
no one could have taken it seriously, and no one did.”211  Although the 
profile contained vulgar language, the court characterized the content as 
so “juvenile” that no one in the school community who might see the 
profile would suspect that Mr. McGonigle actually possessed the type of 
character described in the profile.212  Furthermore, the court also 
considered in its decision the fact that J.S. made the profile “private,” 
inferring that she never intended for the page to reach school grounds.213 
The second of the two en banc rulings issued by the Third Circuit on 
the same day was Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage School 
District.214  Justin Layshock, a senior at Hickory High School, created a 
fake profile of his principal, Mr. Trosch, on MySpace.215  Similar to J.S., 
Layshock created the profile during non-school hours and on a home 
computer.216  Also like J.S., Layshock posted a picture of Mr. Trosch on 
the profile, which he copied and pasted from the school district’s 
website.217  In a section titled “[T]ell me about yourself,” the profile 
featured fictitious answers to a set of survey questions: 
Birthday: too drunk to remember 
Are you a health freak: big steroid freak 
In the past month have you smoked: big blunt 
In the past month have you been on pills: big pills 
In the past month have you gone Skinny Dipping: big lake, not 
big dick 
In the past month have you Stolen Anything: big keg 
Ever been drunk: big number of times 
Ever been called a Tease: big whore 
 
210. Id. at 931. 
211. Id. at 930. 
212. Id. at 929–30. 
213. Id. at 930 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
214. Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011) (en 
banc), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012). 
215. Id. at 207–08. 
216. Id. at 207 (explaining that Layshock created the profile page using his 
grandmother’s computer). 
217. Id. at 207–08. 
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Ever been Beaten up: big fag 
Ever Shoplifted: big bag of kmart [sic] 
Number of Drugs I have taken: big218 
Further, he listed “Transgender, Appreciators of Alcoholic 
Beverages” as “Interests” of Mr. Trosch, and “Steroids International” 
was included as an organization to which Mr. Trosch was a member.219  
The profile was viewed by other students whom Layshock listed as 
“friends,” who included “most, if not all,” of the students that attended 
Hickory High School.220  Not long after Justin created the fake profile, 
three other students created bogus profiles of Mr. Trosch and posted 
them to MySpace, all of which were more vulgar and offensive than 
Justin’s profile.221  The profiles were viewed during school hours, 
although the school was unable to determine how many students 
actually accessed them.222 
When Mr. Trosch learned of the fake profiles—which he believed to 
be “‘degrading,’ ‘demeaning,’ ‘demoralizing,’ and ‘shocking,’”223—and 
that Layshock created the original profile,224 he punished Layshock with 
a ten-day, out-of-school suspension.225  Additionally, Layshock was 
placed in the Alternative Education Program for the remainder of the 
school year, was banned from all extracurricular activities, and was not 
allowed to participate in his high school graduation ceremony.226 
The Third Circuit ruled that the school district violated Layshock’s 
First Amendment free speech rights by punishing his expressive 
conduct.227  The issue the court focused on was whether Layshock’s use 
of Mr. Trosch’s picture, obtained from the School District’s website, was 
considered entering the school.228  The court struck down the School 
 
218. Id. at 208. 
219. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
220. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
221. Id. 
222. Id. at 209. 
223. Id.  
224. Mr. Trosch’s daughter who was in eleventh grade informed Mr. Trosch about the 
profiles.  Id. at 208.  He discovered all three profiles and learned that Layshock was 
responsible for creating the first about six days later.  Id. at 208–09. 
225. Id. at 210. 
226. Id. at 210. 
227. Id. at 216. 
228. Id. at 214–15, 219.  The District Court found no substantial disruption occurred by 
using the website, nor could one reasonably conclude that the profile would cause substantial 
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District’s argument that using the district’s website to obtain a 
photograph “forge[d] a nexus between the School and [Layshock’s] 
profile.”229  Because Layshock’s “expression” was considered outside the 
schoolhouse gate, the court refused to apply Fraser,230 and ultimately 
concluded that the school was not allowed to discipline Layshock for his 
expressive conduct.231 
The cases above illustrate several courts’ attempts to protect student 
expression that occurs on the Internet.  The courts in Beussink and 
Evans seemed to focus on the content of the speech when determining 
that the speech deserved protection.232  The courts were unwilling to 
limit speech that expressed a negative opinion of the school and school 
authorities but did nothing more.233  The Third Circuit decisions, 
however, displayed a hesitancy to reach beyond the school yard, even 
though the content of the student speech was arguably offensive to some 
viewers.234 
Trying to unify and make sense of the lower courts’ holdings in 
student Internet speech cases is frustrating.  The inconsistencies in the 
lower courts’ holdings leave schools at a troubling position when 
deciding whether they have the ability to discipline a student for 
offensive speech aimed at the school or school authorities.  Comparing 
these cases with those in Part III.A exemplifies the necessity of a 
Supreme Court ruling. 
IV. TINKER IN THE INTERNET AGE 
The Internet—“an international network of interconnected 
 
disruption in the future.  Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 
587, 600–01 (W.D. Pa. 2007) (“The actual disruption was rather minimal—no classes were 
cancelled, no widespread disorder occurred, there was no violence or student disciplinary 
action.”), vacated, reh’g granted en banc, 650 F.3d 205 (3rd. Cir. 2011). 
229. Layshock, 650 F.3d at 214–15. 
230. Id. at 216 (“It would be an unseemly and dangerous precedent to allow the state, in 
the guise of school authorities, to reach into a child’s home and control his/her actions there 
to the same extent that it can control that child when he/she participates in school sponsored 
activities.”). 
231. Id. at 219. 
232. See supra text accompanying notes 187, 194. 
233. See Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1374 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (noting that the 
student’s language “was not lewd, vulgar, threatening, or advocating illegal or dangerous 
behavior”); Beussink ex rel. Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1181 
(E.D. Mo. 1998) (noting that “no significant disruption to school discipline occurred”). 
234. See supra text accompanying notes 194–231. 
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computers”235 that enables “millions of people to communicate with one 
another and to access vast amounts of information from around the 
world”236—is now an essential tool in many peoples’ daily lives.237  
Because of the Internet’s increasingly important role in society, 
eventually the Supreme Court will have to rule on the constitutionality 
of schools disciplining student expression on the Internet.238  Taking into 
account the Court’s history of emphasizing the role of schools in 
instilling democratic values239 and the role the Internet plays in 
adolescent’s daily lives,240 our nation’s high court will likely decide that 
schools do have some discretion to control student Internet expression 
to preserve the school’s educational mission.  Part IV.A will examine 
the characteristics of the evolving Internet and the implications for 
student expression.  Part IV.B will then discuss how Internet speech 
disrupts the school environment and why schools should be given 
discretion to regulate this type of student speech. 
A. The Internet as a Social Context 
For today’s young people, a time when the Internet was not 
immediately accessible is virtually unfathomable.  Given labels such as 
“Net natives,”241 “the Internet generation,” “cyberkids,” and “the digital 
 
235. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997). 
236. Id. at 850. 
237. See AMANDA LENHART ET AL., PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, SOCIAL 
MEDIA  &  MOBILE  INTERNET  USE  AMONG  TEENS  AND  YOUNG  ADULTS  5  (2010), 
available at http://www.pewInternet.org/Reports/2010/Social-Media-and-Young-Adults.aspx 
(discussing the rising Internet use among teens and young adults). 
238. The Supreme Court denied Blue Mountain School District’s petition for certiorari 
on January 17, 2012.  Lyle Denniston, Students, MySpace and the First Amendment, 
HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 19, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lyle-denniston/students-
myspace-and-the-_b_1214709.html.  The general counsel for the National School Boards 
Association was disappointed by the Court’s decision to deny certiorari: 
We've missed an opportunity to really clarify for school districts what their 
responsibility and authority is at a time when kids are using electronic media 
instantaneously, and especially when those messages are so impactful and 
immediate on the school setting . . . .  This is one of those cases where the law is 
simply lagging behind the times. 
Maryclaire Dale, Supreme Court Rejects Appeal by Blue Mountain School District, 
REBUBLICANHERALD.COM, Jan. 18, 2012, http://republicanherald.com/news/supreme-court-r
ejects-appeal-by-blue-mountain-school-district-1.1259142 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
239. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
240. See generally LENHART ET AL., supra note 237. 
241. Kathryn C. Montgomery, Youth and Digital Democracy: Intersections of Practice, 
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generation,”242 today’s young people have incorporated the Internet into 
their daily lives much quicker than any other age group.243  A study from 
September 2009 showed that 93% of teenagers between age twelve and 
seventeen use the Internet—compared to 74% of adults age eighteen 
and older.244  Approximately two-thirds of those teenagers use the 
Internet every day, with at least a little over one-third of them going 
online several times a day.245  Further, access to the Internet is no longer 
limited to sitting in front of a desktop, clicking a mouse, and typing on a 
keyboard.  Although desktop and laptop computers remain the most 
popular machines used to go online, young people are increasingly using 
portable devices such as cell phones, tablets, and handheld gaming 
devices to wirelessly access the Internet from any location.246 
Early conceptualizations of the Internet in relation to society 
equated the Internet with a separate, physical place.247  Likewise, the 
theories on the relationship between the Internet and society suggested 
that Internet users could separate their online selves from their off-line 
selves.248  These theories suggested that a clear distinction existed 
between the online world and off-line world.  By separating their online 
lives from their off-line lives, Internet users remained anonymous and 
explored social worlds unconnected to their real-world lives,249 perhaps 
taking advantage of a way to play and experiment with their identities.250  
With this understanding of the Internet, making a distinction between 
Internet postings of a student off school grounds and those made by a 
student while at school made sense. 
 
Policy, and the Marketplace, in CIVIC LIFE ONLINE: LEARNING HOW DIGITAL MEDIA CAN 
ENGAGE YOUTH 25, 25 (W. Lance Bennett ed., 2008). 
242. SONIA LIVINGSTONE, CHILDREN AND THE INTERNET 21 (2009) (citations 
omitted). 
243. Montgomery, supra note 241, at 25. 
244. LENHART ET AL., supra note 237, at 5. 
245. Id. at 7 (demonstrating that 63% of teens go online every day while 36% go online 
several times a day). 
246. Id. at 14. 
247. See generally Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital 
Anticommons, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 439 (2003).  We even speak of the Internet in spatial terms.  
See id. at 453–54 (highlighting various examples). 
248. See GUSTAVO S. MESCH & ILAN TALMUD, WIRED YOUTH: THE SOCIAL WORLD 
OF ADOLESCENCE IN THE INFORMATION AGE 5 (2010). 
249. Id. at 5–6. 
250. See KAVERI SUBRAHMANYAM & DAVID ŠMAHEL, DIGITAL YOUTH: THE ROLE 
OF MEDIA IN DEVELOPMENT 35 (2011). 
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As the Internet—and our understanding of it—evolved, the 
metaphor of the Internet as a place has diminished.251  Moreover, the 
expansion of the Internet has resulted in its evolution from merely an 
information and communication tool to a social context.252  People use 
the Internet to interact with friends, meet new people, participate in 
groups, and engage communities.253  A modern theory of the relationship 
between the Internet and society views the Internet as a cultural tool 
reflecting real-life social conditions.254  The rapid expansion of the 
Internet and the use of tools such as smart phones and social networking 
sites have changed the online environment from a place where a user 
can be someone else to a medium that is intertwined with the user’s off-
line life.255  Social networking sites, especially, serve as platforms where 
users’ “online dialogue mirrors the exchange of ideas and opinions that 
happens throughout people’s lives off-line, in conversations at home, at 
work, in cafes, and in classrooms.”256 
As a result, the line between online and off-line is blurred, and 
young people in particular “are bringing the people and issues from 
their off-line lives into their online worlds and interactions.”257  
Researchers have consequently characterized the Internet as a social 
 
251. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 521 (2003). 
252. SUBRAHMANYAM & ŠMAHEL, supra note 250, at 103. 
253. Id. 
254. MESCH & TALMUD, supra note 248, at 8; see SUBRAHMANYAM & ŠMAHEL, supra 
note 250, at 34. 
255. See SUBRAHMANYAM & ŠMAHEL, supra note 250, at 35. 
 256.  Facebook Community Standards, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/communi
tystandards/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2012).  Recognizing the interplay of online and off-line social 
interactions, Facebook established standards for online behavior, one of which states that 
“claiming to be another person” is in violation of their terms and undermines the trust of the 
users on the Facebook community.  Id.  The quoted language is no longer part of Facebook’s 
Community Standards.  It was replaced with:  
Facebook gives people around the world the power to publish their own stories, 
see the world through the eyes of many other people, and connect and share 
wherever they go.  The conversation that happens on Facebook—and the opinions 
expressed here—mirror the diversity of the people using Facebook. 
Facebook Community Standards, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/communitystandard
s/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2012); see also Parody, Commentary, and Fan Accounts Policy, 
TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/groups/33-report-a-violation/topics/148-policy-informati
on/articles/106373-parody-commentary-and-fan-accounts-policy (last visited Nov. 17, 2012) 
(allowing users to create parody and fan accounts as long as the user clearly indicates that the 
profile is fake). 
257. SUBRAHMANYAM & ŠMAHEL, supra note 250, at 36. 
14 SULLIVAN (DO NOT DELETE) 3/6/2013  9:32 PM 
726 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [96:689 
context for adolescent development, on par with other contexts like 
church, home, school, and work.258  “Children and young people’s 
[online] activities are primarily exploratory, seeking freedoms online 
that may be constrained off-line, negotiating the social expressions of 
identity, developing new forms of valued expertise, taking risks with 
social norms and personal experiences and, ultimately, integrating 
online and off-line in developing [the self].”259  Thus, the Internet has 
become more than just a medium for information and mass 
communication; rather, it is a dynamic entity that penetrates all spheres 
of life and has the capacity to influence adolescents’ social relationships, 
leisure activities, cultural values, and beliefs.260 
Not only are Internet users’ online activities intertwined with their 
off-line lives, but the nature of the Internet allows users to reach the 
masses.261  As the Supreme Court stated in Reno v. American Civil 
Liberties Union, “[t]hrough the use of chat rooms, any person with a 
phone line can become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther 
than it could from any soapbox.  Through the use of Web pages, mail 
exploders, and newsgroups, the same individual can become a 
pamphleteer.”262  Significantly, an Internet user’s “voice”—especially an 
adolescent Internet user—often resonates with a harsher, less inhibited 
tone than it would off-line. 263   
These characteristics of the Internet and its users have important 
implications for student expression.  Essentially, the Internet is 
 
258. Id. at 34, 137. 
259. LIVINGSTONE, supra note 242, at 31. 
260. See SUBRAHMANYAM & ŠMAHEL, supra note 250, at 32; see also Charlie Stross, 
LOGIN 2009 Keynote: Gaming in the World of 2030, ANTIPOPE.ORG (May, 13, 2009, 10:12 
PM), http://www.antipope.org/charlie/blog-static/2009/05/login-2009-keynote-gaming-in-t.htm
l (“Welcome to a world where the Internet has turned inside-out; instead of being something 
you visit inside a box with a coloured screen, it’s draped all over the landscape around you, 
invisible until you put on a pair of glasses or pick up your always-on mobile phone.  A phone 
which is to today’s iPhone as a modern laptop is to an original Apple II; a device which 
always knows where you are, where your possessions are, and without which you are—
literally—lost and forgetful.”). 
261. See Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom 
of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 33–34 (2004) (identifying five 
ways the Internet makes speech more salient). 
262. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997). 
263. See Waldman, Badmouthing Authority, supra note 4, at 647–49 (examining why the 
characteristics of the Internet coupled with adolescence has led to hostile Internet speech 
about school officials). 
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everywhere; it has no physical, social, or cultural boundaries.264  Because 
of its pervasiveness, any on-campus/off-campus distinction about 
Internet expression makes little sense and should therefore be 
abandoned.265  What is the difference, for example, between a student 
who uses a school computer to post a vulgar comment about a school 
official that is read by his classmates, and a student who stands on a 
public sidewalk facing the school using his iPhone to post the same 
comment?266 
With the rise in the use of handheld Internet-capable devices such as 
tablets and smart phones,267 it is even difficult to differentiate the student 
who stands on a podium in the school assembly hall and calls her 
teacher a “douchebag” from the student who types a similar sentiment 
on her Facebook Timeline (which is instantaneously available for her 
classmates to view).268  Because the Internet is not static but rather an 
 
264. See Kathryn Gregory, How Have Facebook & Other Forms of Social Media 
Changed the Way We Interact? Both Sides of the Story: High School Students, Leaders Differ 
on Impact, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Feb. 5, 2012, at 1F, available at 
http://sundaygazettemail.com/News/201202030259 (interviewing a high school principal who 
suggests that students are addicted to their cell phones and worries that “[i]t’s very hard for 
them to pay attention on what is going on in the classroom when they are 
focused on what is going on on that phone”). 
265. See, e.g., Li, supra note 8, at 92–93 (suggesting that courts abandon the on-
campus/off-campus distinction when analyzing student Internet speech). 
266. See Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 
2011) (en banc) (suggesting that punishing a student for content on a website created outside 
of school “would be an unseemly and dangerous precedent”), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 
(2012). 
267. According to a PEW survey conducted in 2011, 77% of teens have a cell phone, 
and about one in four of those teens has a smart phone.  AMANDA LENHART, 
PEW RESEARCH CENTER, TEENS, SMARTPHONES, & TEXTING 6–7 (2012), available 
at http://pewInternet.org/Reports/2012/Teens-and-smartphones.aspx.  Moreover, teens 
communicate via their phones more than they have face-to-face conversations.  Id. at 16–18 
(showing that on a daily basis, 63% of the teens surveyed communicated through text 
message and 29% communicated through social networking sites, while only 25% 
communicated face-to-face with their friends outside of school). 
268. See Deb Nicklay, Social Media Presents New Challenges to Educators, 
GLOBEGAZETTE.COM, Feb. 4, 2012, http://globegazette.com/news/local/social-media-
presents-new-challenges-to-educators/article_fde0fd7a-4fbc-11e1-85e6-0019bb2963f4.html 
(quoting the legal services director School Administrators of Iowa: “Fifteen years ago you 
might have something said about you at a lunchroom table in front of 15 to 20 kids . . . .  On 
Facebook some kids have 2,000 to 3,000 ‘friends’—and once something is posted it goes to 
that many people immediately.”).  A Timeline is a Facebook user’s “collection of the photos, 
stories, and experiences that tell [the user’s] story.”  Glossary of Terms, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/help/glossary (last visited Nov. 17, 2012). 
14 SULLIVAN (DO NOT DELETE) 3/6/2013  9:32 PM 
728 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [96:689 
interactive and dynamic communicative tool, any expression that targets 
school or school officials will almost inevitably reach the school.  If the 
Internet really was a separate place, distinct and isolated from our “real 
world” lives, then prohibiting schools from regulating student Internet 
speech would make sense.  However, that is not the case.  The limitless 
and pervasive nature of the Internet allows an expression typed by a 
student on his laptop at home to ring loud and clear through the halls at 
school.  In order to uphold its educational mission, a school needs to be 
able to use its discretion to limit speech that is damaging to that 
objective. 
B. Disruption to the Educational Process 
A disparaging comment about a teacher or school administrator on a 
social networking website is not merely a student expressing himself; 
rather, that comment may have an effect on the educational process if it 
reaches the school.  In order to effectively teach students about how to 
be responsible and knowledgeable citizens in a democratic society, 
teachers need to be able to establish a teacher–pupil relationship that is 
based on respect and influence.269  The Court has addressed the 
important roles of teachers in Ambach v. Norwick: 
 Within the public school system, teachers play a critical part 
in developing students’ attitude toward government and 
understanding of the role of citizens in our society.  Alone 
among employees of the system, teachers are in direct, day-to-
day contact with students both in the classrooms and in the other 
varied activities of a modern school.  In shaping the students’ 
experience to achieve educational goals, teachers . . . are 
responsible for presenting and explaining the subject matter in a 
way that is both comprehensible and inspiring . . . .  Further, a 
teacher serves as a role model for his students, exerting a subtle 
but important influence over their perceptions and values . . . .  
This influence is crucial to the continued good health of a 
democracy.270 
An Internet posting about a school official may not cause a 
“substantial disruption” in the literal sense that it “disrupt[s] immediate 
 
269. See supra notes 34–50 and accompanying text. 
270. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 78–79 (1979). 
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classroom activity or school discipline.”271  Nevertheless, an Internet 
posting about a teacher may certainly cause a substantial disruption to 
the educational process in several other ways.  For instance, as one 
commentator points out, “verbal aggression towards teachers can be a 
source of significant stress for teachers.”272  As a result, teachers may 
become disengaged from their classrooms or even decide to leave the 
profession entirely.273  Additionally, if student Internet speech has the 
overall effect of damaging that teacher’s reputation or distorting her 
students’ perceptions about her ability to effectively teach, the teacher 
 
271. Tabor, supra note 10, at 593 (citation omitted). 
272. Waldman, Badmouthing Authority, supra note 4, at 644.  Elona Hartjes discussed 
teachers’ reactions to being bullied by students in her blog.  Elona Hartjes, Some Students 
Bully Teachers Too, TEACHERS AT RISK (May 7, 2007), http://www.teachersatrisk.com/2007/
05/07/some-students-bully-teachers-too/.  Some teachers provided stories for how they have 
been harassed by students and the effect of the harassment on their ability to teach: 
I’ve had almost all I can handle . . . . I have a class of kids who is absolutely 
disrespectful—one has gone so far as to yell at me, call me names, using her cell 
phone (even though there [are] rules about it), tell me not only am I stupid but so is 
anything that I do or have the class do.  I have tried talking to her only to have her 
tell me that she’s not going to put up with this . . . .  I cried today. [F]or the first time 
in front of students, I cried. I couldn’t help it . . . .  This girl does her work. It’s the 
nasty comments she makes about it. It’s constant . . . .  Although some students are 
wonderful, I keep telling myself that it’s one kid—but that only goes so far because 
she is making me miserable and [I]’m finding it really difficult to do my job. 
Valerie, Comment to Some Students Bully Teachers Too, TEACHERS AT RISK (Apr. 23, 2008, 
9:07 PM), http://www.teachersatrisk.com/2007/05/07/some-students-bully-teachers-too/.  
I’m a teacher [and] I have already figured out which students have written 
slanderous comments about me . . . .  I am ready to quit teaching. I try as hard as I 
can to do my best to teach students but they have very little respect these days and 
their parents have no idea what their children are doing [online]. I’ve already 
invested 22 years in my career and I hoping I can stick it out another 8 more years – 
then I will happily retire and move on. 
Angela, Comment to Some Students Bully Teachers Too, TEACHERS AT RISK (Oct. 14, 2009, 
1:42 AM), http://www.teachersatrisk.com/2007/05/07/some-students-bully-teachers-too/.  
For me[] years of false accusations [about] hitting kids, yelling, slamming heads into 
walls, gradually turned into accusations of sexual predation. The final straw was 
being accused by some of the most disruptive kids in the class of trying to film their 
chests when I attempted to film them working on year end projects. I used to live in 
Paraguay, one of the most corrupt countries on earth. Nothing I can think of from 
that experience comes close to the treatment I received in my own country. 
Karl Liebhardt, Comment to Some Students Bully Teachers Too, TEACHERS AT RISK (Nov. 
26, 2011, 4:06 AM), http://www.teachersatrisk.com/2007/05/07/some-students-bully-teachers-
too/. 
273. Waldman, Badmouthing Authority, supra note 4, at 644–46.  
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may not be viewed as a role model, perhaps losing that influence which 
is crucial to her role as an educator.274  These are instances when the 
educational process may certainly be disrupted.275 
To be clear, many students use the Internet as an outlet to vent their 
frustrations about school.276  Most of these expressions would likely be 
protected speech because they are generally anonymous and have no 
connection to the students’ schools.  It is when a student goes as far as 
creating a false profile or humiliate a teacher online—similar to J.S. and 
K.L. 277 or Justin Layshock278—where that speech should no longer be 
considered protected. 279  To be sure, sometimes an Internet posting or 
fictitious profile may be so “outrageous” that a student should be able to 
disassociate the “fake” ideas expressed online from the “real” teacher 
instructing them at the front of the classroom.280  However, in today’s 
digital society where the line between the online and off-line world is 
blurring,281 students may actually have a more difficult time 
differentiating the outrageous from the genuine.  Therefore, to ensure 
that schools can effectively fulfill their educational mission of instilling 
democratic values, the schools must be able to regulate certain Internet 
expression that has an impact on the school environment. 
  
 
274. Supra note 272 and accompanying text. 
275. See supra note 273. 
276. The author of this comment attempted several Internet searches, including “I hate 
my teacher,” “I hate my school,” and “my teacher sucks.”  The result was thousands of sites, 
including forums, YouTube videos, Facebook pages, and blogs where students vented about 
their teachers and schools. 
277. See supra text accompanying notes 194–203.  
278. See supra text accompanying notes 215–19. 
279. See, e.g., Thomas v. Bd. of Ed., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1057 (2d 
Cir. 1979) (Newman, J., concurring) (“School authorities can regulate indecent language 
because its circulation on school grounds undermines their responsibility to try to promote 
standards of decency and civility among school children . . . .  With its captive audience of 
children, many of whom, along with their parents, legitimately expect reasonable regulation, a 
school need not capitulate to a student’s preference for vulgar expression.  A school’s 
authority to condemn indecent language is not inconsistent with a student’s right to express 
his views.”). 
280. See Snyder II, 650 F.3d 915, 930 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
281. See supra text accompanying notes 258–68. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court seems hesitant to decide whether schools may 
regulate student Internet speech.282  Perhaps the Court is hesitant to 
develop a standard for speech involving rapidly-changing technology 
until it more fully understands the impact of the Internet in the school 
setting.283  Nevertheless, in each of the four student speech cases, the 
Court indicated that a school provides a unique context for student 
rights, and, in light of that unique context, the Court balanced the 
school’s interests with the student’s rights.284  Because the Internet has 
no boundaries, speech that implicates the school or school personnel 
should be analyzed under Tinker’s substantial disruption test as if it 
were spoken within the bricks and mortar of the building. 
Because of the Supreme Court’s silence, state and local legislatures 
need to step in and address the issue.285  As discussed above, many state 
constitutions and statutes include educational objectives that identify 
schools as places where students learn respect and prepare for 
citizenship.286  Student Internet speech that harasses or impersonates a 
school authority figure is contrary to these educational objectives and, 
therefore, should be punishable under this standard if it causes the sort 
of disruption mentioned above287 or invades a teacher’s rights. 288  As 
stated by the Supreme Court, “The schools, as instruments of the state, 
may determine that the essential lessons of civil, mature conduct cannot 
be conveyed in a school that tolerates lewd, indecent, or offensive 
 
282. See supra note 243. 
283. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n., 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011) (identifying the 
“challenges of applying the Constitution to ever-advancing technology”).  
284. See discussion supra Part III. 
285. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 421 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Local 
school boards, not the courts, should determine what pedagogical interests are ‘legitimate’ 
and what rules ‘reasonably relat[e]’ to those interests.” (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. 
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988))).  For example, North Carolina has already taken action 
against Internet postings that disparage teachers by making it a crime to “intimidate or 
torment” teachers online.  Steve Eder, Teachers Fight Online Slams: Amid Free-Speech 
Concerns, Law Targets Comments that ‘Torment’ Faculty, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2012, at A3; 
see 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 149 §14-458.2 (outlining a cyber-bullying provision that prohibits 
such activities as creating fake profiles or Web sites, or posting real or doctored images of 
school employees on the Internet). 
286. See supra notes 44–46 and accompanying text. 
287. See supra notes 271–75 and accompanying text. 
288. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1986). 
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speech and conduct . . . .”289  Indeed, “schools may not be enclaves of 
totalitarianism,”290 but a school cannot function as an educational 
institution if its students are allowed to bypass this educational 
objective. 
Admittedly, determining what type of Internet expression should 
and should not be punishable is difficult to decide and depends on the 
individual facts and the type of speech.  But schools are given broad 
discretion to manage their day-to-day affairs.291  Most schools have 
student handbooks or codes of conduct that provide notice to students 
concerning what types of behaviors are punishable.292  Perhaps school 
districts could simply include a clause in these manuals indicating that 
the student code of conduct applies to inappropriate expression on the 
Internet that disrupts or may disrupt the educational process at the 
school, notwithstanding where the expression originated.  A broad 
statement such as that would provide a student with sufficient notice 
that Internet activity is punishable; yet it allows the school discretion in 
determining whether a specific activity is actually disruptive to the 
educational process. 
The Internet is evolving.293  Even over a few short years, it has 
drastically become increasingly intertwined with our daily functions.294  
Once the Internet is more commonly understood as something greater 
than an information and communication tool, society may come to 
appreciate the significant impact that it has on individuals, even in the 
“off-line” world.295  Likewise, student expressions on the Internet have a 
great impact on the school environment, especially if the expressions are 
directed at a teacher or school authority.296  What one student writes 
online about a teacher may influence how another student views that 
teacher, and could result in a loss of respect for the teacher and lack of 
subordination necessary in a teacher-pupil relationship.297  Therefore, it 
is necessary that the Supreme Court steps in to clarify the authority 
 
289. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986). 
290. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511. 
291. See Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 863–64 (1982) (citations omitted). 
292. See supra text accompanying notes 50–52. 
293. See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
294. See supra text accompanying notes 250–63. 
295. See supra notes 251–55 and accompanying text. 
296. See discussion supra Part IV.B. 
297. See supra notes 269–74 and accompanying text. 
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schools have over student Internet speech in light of the educational 
mission of the school and the students’ First Amendment rights.   
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